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a beneficial change, those who profit, or believe they profit, by the old
abuses are quick to resist and persevering in opposition, while those to
be benefitted are apathetic, if not befooled into active resistance.
A few years ago I discovered that if $10 were paid at the beginning
of every suit filed in Louisville, tha revenue would be enough to pay the
expenses of all the courts there. A lawsuit should be tried in court with
simple procedure, without cost and with no serious delay. A free court
for deciding what is right between man and man is as essential as free
schools, free libraries, free hospitals and a free ballot. The indefinite
and heavy costs now imposed upon litigants do not deter the litigious and
unjust, but do deter the good and the careful, who will often endure
oppression rather than risk further loss. The courts should not be the
refuge mainly of rich men or mere paupers, but should be the refuge
always of the honest, industrious citizen of little means and blameless
life.
EDWARD J. MoDn~moxT.
THE DEMURRER UNDER THE CIVIL CODE OF
PRACTICE IN KENTUCKY
Section, 89 of the Civil Code of Practice, declares, "The pleadings
allowed are, 1-Petitions, answers, and replies, and such additional
pleadings, by way of rejoinder and rebuttal, as may be necessary to form
a material issue of fact. 2---Demurrer. It will be the purpose of this
article to take up the demurrer as established under our so-called code
procedure and to note the material changes that have been made in the
demurrer as it existed at common law.
Section 91 of the Civil Code declares, "Demurrers are
Special or general.' Mr. Perry in his Common Law Pleading, p.
233, states: "A demurrer, as in its nature, so also in its form, if of two
kinds: It is either general or special." Again the Code in defining the
demurrer as used in this State says in section 92: "A special demurrer
is an objection to a pleading which shows:
1. That the court has no jurisdiction of the defendant or of the
subject of the action; or
2. That the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue; or
3. That another action is pending, in this State, between the same
parties, for the same cause; or,
4. That there is a defect of the parties, plaintiff or defendant.
Either of said grounds of objection shown to exist by a pleading is waived
unless distinctly specified by a demurrer thereto, except the objection to
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the jurisdiction of the court of the subject matter of the action; which
objection is not waived by failing so to make it; but a party failing so to
make it when or before he files a pleading other than a demurrer, is
liable for all costs resulting from such failure."
Section 93 of the Code further describes a general demurrer: "A
general demurrer is an objection to a pleading because it does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or a defense or because it
does not state facts suffiicient to support a cause of action or defense."
Stephen on Pleading p. 158, defines the demurrers at common law: "A
general demurrer excepts to the sufficiency in general terms, without
showing specifically the nature of the objection. A special demurrer adds
to this specification of the particular ground."
It will be noticed that there is no material difference between the
general demurrer at common law and the general demurrer as defined
by the Code of this State. There is, however, a material and marked
difference between the special demurrer at common law and the special
demurrer of the Code of Practice. There is, however, a material and
marked difference between the special demurrer at common law and the
special demurrer under the Code. The main difference in the special de-
murrer of the Code and at common law, is, "A special demurrer is neces-
sarily where it turns upon a matter of form only; that it, where, notwith-
standing such objection, enough appears to entitle the opposite party to
judgment, as far as relates to the merit of the cause. For by two statutes,
27 Elizabeth, c. 5, and 4 Anne, c. 16, passed in a view to the discourage-
ment of merely formal objections, it is provided, in nearly the same
terms, that the judges 'shall give judgment dccording as the very right
of the cause and matter in law shall appear unto them without regarding
any imperfection, omission, or defect or want of form, except those only
which the party demurring shall specifically and particularly set down
and express, together with his demurrer, as causes of the same;" the
latter statute adding this proviso: 'So as sufficient matter appear in the
said pleadings, upon which the court may give judgment according to
the very right of the cause, since these statutes therefore, no mere matter
of form can be objected on a general demurrer; but the dmurrer must
be in the special form and the objection specially stated." Stephen on
Pleading, p. 158.
But in Kentucky, defect in the form of pleading can only be reached
by motion to make more specific, and not by a special demurrer. In the
case of Posey vs. Green, 78 Ky. 162, Judge Hines delivering the opinion
of the court said: "The general demurrer under the Code is the same
as that under the common law proceduce and reaches only matter of sub-
stance. The reply in this case is in substance good, and, if defective,
is only so in form, and as the special demurrer as provided for in section
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92 of the Code does not reach the formal defect complained of, resort can
only be had to the 134th section of the Code of Practice which declares,
"If the allegation of a pleading is so indefinite or uncertain that the
precise nature of the claim or defense is not apparent, the court may
require the pleading to be made definite and certain by an amendment.
The court must strike out any error in the proceeding which does not
affect the substantial rights of the adverse party; and no judgment shall
be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect."
Mr. Pomeroy, in his work on Remedies and Remedial Rights, see.
596, states the rule as follows: "If the defect is one merely of form; if
the denial for example, although sufficiently addressed to the plaintiff's
allegations to indicate the intended issues, are so formally defective that
it is a question whether the denials or denials attempted to be made, do in
fact accomplish the purpose for which they were intended; or if the aver-
ments of new matter in some sort embrace or refer to facts which, if prop-
erly pleaded, would amount to a defense, or a counter-claim, but are stated
in such an uncertain, ambiguous, inferrential manner that it is a question
whether they can avail to the defendant in such cases, it is settled that
the demurrer is not the proper mode of reaching the defect. Instead
of the special demurrer, the Codes have substituted the motion to make
the pleadings more specific and certain."
Lastly the difference between the special demurrer under the Code
of Practice, and at common law. The special demurrer at common law
is more comprehensive than the special demurrer under the Code. The
special demurrer at common law is broader than the general demurrer;
for it might reach substance as well as form. (Stephen p. 189.) The
special demurrer under the Code of Kentucky, is confined to the causes
enumerated in section 92. All said grounds for demurrer are waived,
unless specified by demurrer thereto, except jurisdiction of the court.
Having noticed the scope of the demurrer as exists at common law
and as defined by the Code of Practice, we shall consider the effect of the
demurrer at common law, and as modified by the Code.
Stephen on Pleading, says: "With respect to the effect of a demurrer
it is, first a rule that a demurrer admits all such matters of fact as are
sufficiently pleaded.
The meaning of this rule is that the party having had his option
whether to plead or demur, shall be taken in adopting the latter alterna-
tive, to admit that he has no ground for denial or traverse (which as
formerly shown) is one of the kinds of pleading. A demurrer is conse-
quently an admission that the facts alleged are true; and therefore the
-only question for the court is, whether assuming the facts to be true,
they sustain the case of the party by whom they are alleged. It will be
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observed, however, that the rule is laid down with this qualification, hat
the matters of fact be sufficiently pleaded."
In the case of Norman, Auditor, vs. The Kentucky Board of Man-
agers, the facts were these: The commissioners representing the State,
brought an action against the State Auditor to compel him by mandamus,
to issue his warrant for money claimed to have been appropriated by an
Act of the Legislature. The answer of the Auditor set out these facts
connected with the passage of the Act: The Journals of the two Houses,
which showed that the bill was not passed as required by the constitution.
The appellee desiring to raise the question-Can the Auditor go behind
the enrolled bill to the records of the Houses to see if a bill is passed
properly-demurred to the answer. Chief Justice Holt, delivering the
opinion of the court said: "Although the pleading may purport to state
its terms or effect, but do so incorrectly, a demurrer does not admit the
averment (Pennie vs. Reis, 132 IT. S. 464; Interstate Land Co. vs. Max-
well Land Grant Co. 139 U. S. 569.) The court tries the question as one
of law and a demurrer admits as true only averments of the fact well
pleaded, and not legal conclusions. The answer of the Auditor, however,
sets out the steps connected with the passage of the Act. It states what
was done and what was not done. It avers the facts connected with the
passage of the Act, and files as part of it a copy made by the Public
Printer of the Journals of the Senate relating to it. These facts, as to
the manner of the passage, were admitted by a general demurrer. They
show the Act when it came back to the Senate, after amendment, was not
voted for by a majority of all the Senators and that a yea and nay vote
was not taken; it was not therefore constitutionally passed and yet the
court is asked by the appellees to use its power to enforce it by mandamus
when, by their demurrer to the answer and failure to plead, they are
regarded as agreeing that this is true." See further Morgan vs. Ballard,
1 Mar. 558; Bank vs. New Port, 1 B. M. 13.
Stephen on Pleading, p. 160, says: "Again it is a rule, that on a
demurrer the court will consider the whole record and will give judgment,
for the party who, on the whole, appears to be entitled to it. Thus, on
demurrer to the replication, if the court thinks the replication bad, but
perceive a substantial fault in the plea, they will give judgment not for
the defendant, but for the plaintiff, provided the declaration be good, but
if the declaration be bad also, in substance, then upon the same principle,
judgment would be given for the defendant. This belongs to the general
principle stated in the first chapter, that when judgment is to be given,
whether the issue be in law, or fact, and whether its cause have proceeded
to issue, or not, the court is always bound to examine the whole record,
and adjudge for the plaintiff or defendant according to the legal right,
as it may on the whole appear"
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This principle of law as stated by Mr. Stephen, is upheld by the
courts of this State. In the case of Wile vs. Sweeny, 2 Duvall 161, the
appellant filed an answer to which the appellee demurred, and the de-
murrer having been sustained, a judgment was rendered for the appellees
from which this appeal is taken. Chief Justice Sampson, speaking for the
court said: "The demurrer to the answer brought the whole record before
the court, and it was the duty of the court to render judgment upon the
demurrer against the party who had committed the first material error
in his pleadings. As the sufficiency of the petition, is therefore involved,
the first question for consideration is, whether it sets forth a good cause of
action.' Again in the case of Youhg vs. Duhme, 4 Met. 239, Justice
Peters delivering the opinion of the court said: "The demurrer of the
appellees to the answer brought the whole record before the court in de-
ciding upon the demurrer, it was the duty of the court to decide against
the party who committed the first fault. (Mitchell vs. Vance, 5 Mon.
528.; Birney vs. Haun, 3 A. K. Mar. 322.)"
Next let us notice, the effect of failure to demur, at common law
and such material changes as have been made by the Code Procedure.
Stephen on Pleading, p. 162, says: "It thus appears then, that in many
cases, that a party though he has pleaded over without demurring, may
nevertheless, afterwards avail himself of an insufficiency in the pleading
of his adversary. But this is not universally true. For, in many in-
stances it is to be observed, that faults in the pleading are, in some cases,
aided by pleading over. Again it is to be observed that faults in the
pleadings are in some cases aided by a verdict. Lastly it is to be observed
that in certain stages of the cause all objections to form are cured by the
different statutes of jeofails and amendment."
Section 93 of the Cod estates-Effect of failure to demur--- Failure
so to make such objection is not a waiver thereof, but a party failing to
make it when or before he files a pleading, other than a demurrer shall
be liable for all costs resulting from such failure." In the case of Fible
vs. Caplinger, 52 Ky. 374, Chief Justice Hise, speaking for the court said:
"The failure of the plaintiff's petition to present a good cause of action
not cured by the verdict of the jury, because such failure of the petitio'n
was not supplied by the answer of the defendant, which relied upon as a
matter of defense, the alleged facts that the plaintiff was an infant. There
was nothing, therefore, in the answer to cure the defect in the petition,
nor in fact was there any evidence whatever in the cause showing the
offer by the plaintiff or the refusal by the defendant, to perform the
agreement. If a petition be so defective that is does not, in fact, show
a cause of action, or state facts enough to warrant a recovery, such defect
is not cured after the verdict by any of the provisions of our statute of
jeofails, when the other pleadings do not, in fact, cure the defect, and
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where the verdict does not settle upon the proof or the fact omitted or
defectively stated, and such defect under the Code of Practice, may be
taken advantage of by demurrer or answer; and although such defect is
not taken advantage of by demurrer or by answer, yet it is not waived and
may be taken advantage of by motion for an arrest of judgment, or by
writ of error. (Code of Prac. p. 31, sec. 146-9.)"
It will be noticed that the Kentucky has adopted by construction of
the court, and by section 93 of the Code, almost the exact statement as
set forth by Mir. Stephen above. Many other comparisons can be made
of the common law procedure and the pleading set forth in the Civil
Code, which will show that the Code is only declaratory of the common
law procedure. The main and material change of the demurrer under
the Code of Kentucky, being in the definition and application of the
special demurrer,
-BASIL DuxE SAnTIN.
EXAMINATIONS IN EVIDENCE
List of examination questions given by Judge Lyman Chalkley, of the
University of Kentucky, to his class at the conclusion of the course
in Evidence.
I. In the pleadings and in the introduction of evidence before the
jury, what things may counsel take it for granted the court knows with-
out proof ?
II. State the rules by which the production of evidence to the jury
is governed, and explain the circumstances under which facts collateral
to the issue may be proved.
III. The action is debt against a sheriff for illegal fees taken on a
writ of execution: plaintiff alleges, in effect, that a judgment was re-
covered by A. B. vs. C. D., on a certain day and upon that judgment,
execution was issued, and that under cover of that execution the sheriff
exacted the illegal fees. Will the plaintiff have to prove the recovery of
the judgment? State the rule of law and give your reasoning.
IV. State both the Common Law and the Kentucky Statute rules
as to Burden of Proof, and explain the different meanings which are
given to the term "Burden of Proof."
V. (1) State the rule under which evidence is classified as
"Primary" and "Secondary."
(2) Upon his examination before the magistrate upon a crimi-
nal warrant, the prisoner made a confession, which is taken down in writ-
